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Article 10

It should come as no surprise to
those familiar with the artist Robert
Morris that the title of his new collection of work and writings, Have
I Reasons, invokes Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Philosophical InvestigaHave I Reasons: Work and Writtions: “Have I reasons? The answer
ings, 1993–2007 by Robert Morris.
is: my reasons will soon give out.
Edited and introduced by Nena
And then I shall act, without reaTsouti-Schillinger. Durham, NC:
sons” (65). Wittgenstein, after all,
Duke University Press, 2008. Pp.
was a major point of reference in
273. $84.95 cloth; $23.95 paper.
Morris’s first collection of writings,
Continuous Project Altered Daily
(1993), as the theorist who spoke
most directly to Morris’s concern
with the suppression of the linguistic dimension of art by modernist
criticism. Morris transforms the “I”
of Wittgenstein’s interrogation into
the declarative of the book’s title,
implicitly offering the authority of
first-person narrative and to promise “reasons” behind the Morris oeuvre. Wittgenstein is joined in this
second volume by the likes of Noam
Chomsky and Donald Davidson;
the latter’s linguistic philosophy is
addressed directly by two essays,
and his influence is felt in several
others. This interest in the theoretical underpinnings of language is
also no surprise; Morris has consistently been one of the most well
read, articulate, and intensely selfconscious artists in the last one hundred years, and as Tsouti-Schillinger
argues in the introduction, “any
complete analysis and assessment of
Morris’s total artistic contribution
would prove inadequate without
consideration and inclusion of his
copious writings.” What is surprising
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is the powerful presence of the words
of others in these pages, and not
only from the recurring voices of
his favorite theorists. Morris repeats
pet quotations throughout the book
(Elizabeth Bishop’s remark that the
twentieth century was “the worst so
far” appears in at least three essays)
as well as numerous epigrams, block
quotes, and intersectional quotations. This idiosyncrasy crescendos
in his essay for the National Gallery’s
recent Jasper Johns retrospective,
which carries a list of citations to
rival any academic article.
For those in search of the artist
himself, the opening account of
Morris’s childhood in Kansas City,
“Indiana Street,” seems to offer just
the tidbits of artistic origin that typically fill artists’ biographies. Describing the physical terrain of
Indiana Street, for instance, Morris
writes, “It was with secret pleasure
that I squeezed my body between
the pole and the side of the garages,
making my passage usually at dusk.
Although unnamed, and perhaps
unnamable, such spaces, of which
there were many around the neighborhood, took on a special character. I would usually visit each once
a week” (22). Under the sway of such
evocative images, what art historian can resist picturing Robert
Morris squeezed inside of Passageway, the narrow semicircular channel of painted plywood he installed
in the entrance to Yoko Ono’s loft
in 1961? And who can help finding
the many faces of Morris’s career
prefigured in the characters that

populate his memory? The Morris
who would grow up to dance with
Yvonne Rainer and Simone Forti
of “youthful strength and delight
in physical grace of movements”
(29) seems already personified in
the neighborhood ice delivery man.
The wraithlike Turtle Bill trolls the
streets in a cart full of rags and scrap
iron that prefigures Morris dressed
in rags for his performance of War
(1963). Morris’s late references to
autism are presaged by the mentally handicapped boy, who “with
the inertia of what the others termed
his ‘simpleness,’ seemed to have
dropped through the insulation of
their linguistic repressions to move
against some clammy, sexual membrane that pulsed hidden and unmentioned just below the surface of
those lives on Indiana Street” (28).
But what binds together the myriad
phenomenological, socioeconomic,
political and sexual awakenings related in this opening gambit is the
trusted voice and coherent identity
of Morris the Author.
In the two essays that follow “Indiana Street,” Morris uses his knowledge of linguistics to reflect on the
role of the artist in the writing of his
own history as well as the role of reason in artistic production. Switching
from first to third person for “Writing with Davidson,” Morris agrees
with the philosopher’s assertion
that reasons (associated with beliefs
and desires) are sufficient to hold
the status of causes. But the inclusion of Davidson quotations in the
borders of Blind Time Drawings, a

ON ROBERT MORRIS’S HAVE I REASONS
set of drawings made with Morris’s
eyes closed or blindfolded, unsettles
the notion of intentionality associated with reason, belief, rationality,
and holism (all central to Davidson’s
philosophy) through the voluntary
renunciation of control and judgment
in these chance-directed actions.
Throughout the essays, the interplay
of reason, artistic intention, and the
personal pronoun further obscure
the already ambiguous role of artists’ writing in criticism and art history. Morris most directly confronts
the issue of self-interpretation in
“Professional Rules,” which returns
us to the first-person of the title only
to take it away again:
In the studio I ask myself this
question: What will happen if
I do a and then b? After that I
ask further, Now what happens after c and then d? Much
later, and in the context of the
public space of the gallery, is
it then a misinterpretation for
others to take the object I have
made as first a “statement,”
about which subsequent questions are then to be asked?
And you—that is to say, R.
Morris; and I will adopt the
you to address him from here
on in—want to say that your
questions in the making not
only preceded the object but
resulted in it? (63, 65)
The first half of the collection is
concerned with the fixity that the
object, the gallery, and the stable
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first-person of the artist seem to
lend to artistic practice. It is the latter
that Morris frequently abdicates,
only to restore it again and again
in his writing, oscillating between
adamant self-erasure and reluctant authoritarianism. Such play is
reminiscent of Morris’s 1962 I-Box,
a plywood cabinet whose I-shaped
door opened to reveal a photograph
of a nude, grinning Morris, that
suggested both the fading away of
the artistic persona behind the pronoun and a further assertion of authorial continuity.
This series of usurpations is played
out not only in the frequent shifts of
grammatical person but also in the
quotation and scripting of others by
Morris. This tack was central to
Morris’s performances during the
1960s and 1970s, most poignantly
the performance 21.3, in which the
artist, dressed in the stale tweed of
academia, mouthed the words of an
essay by Irwin Panofsky’s along to a
recorded reading of the text. The
transcription of Birthday Boy, a
projection shown in the Galleria
dell’Accademia in Florence in 2004,
similarly blurs the distinction between artist and scholar, presentation and performance. In the work
two actors deliver “academic” lectures on Michelangelo’s David that
begin by denying, but ultimately
indulge in, the notion of object
of art as an object of desire. The
distance enforced by academic language breaks down as the two lecturers are handed glass after glass of
red wine. As these presentations are
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revealed as acts of projection, slides
of Krazy Kat and Mussolini make
their way into the carousel, along
with images of David morphed into
the body of a black woman and a
middle-aged man.
It is also worth noting that the
only Morris interview included in
the collected writings takes place
“From the Chomskian Couch,” as
an imagined conversation with
Noam Chomsky, who acts as the
analyst to Morris’s analysand. If we
were to look at the generation that
preceded Morris—to Jackson Pollock’s stint in Jungian analysis, for
example—we might find the analyst’s couch to be the very symbol of
the artist-subject as the great wellspring of art. Yet the unconscious
that Chomsky plumbs is not Morris’s but the “imperial unconscious”
(impunc) dedicated to the suppression of the other, and a peculiar
American rejection of pastness. The
impunc is one in a set of newly
coined acronyms that suggest the
conjoining of the art world and the
military industrial complex: the mega
image (megig), American Phenomenological Awe (amphena), the
multiscreen video installation
(muscrivt) or the installation art of
the spectacle (inarse). These, Morris argues, are the facets of the
“Wagner effect,” an utterly American art “of looming icons of dominating presence, offering a kind of
odd forgiveness secretly addressed
to those whose guilty lives make
such expressions possible” (129).
“Style,” Morris continues, “does not

matter much for the Wagner effect,
gigantic size and expense being the
generating engine. Of course, besides the grandiosity, touches of the
mystical and allusions to origins
don’t hurt either—they didn’t hurt
Wagner” (129).
Morris links the Wagner effect
first to the shift by American museums from an institution open to the
public, to an institution that serves
the public, and subsequently to the
entry of the artist into the larger service economy that caters to popular
taste. Initially an attempt to overcome the contemporary environment of spectacle, Wagnerian art
was quickly absorbed by it. Amid
this rapid commercialization of the
aesthetic, Morris asks the timely
question: “What, I would like to
know, is to be asked of the social
body that sometimes finds itself inside a museum?” (158). Just as the
artistic unconscious has been displaced by an imperial one, we find
that the empirical-phenomenal body
of ’60s art has been replaced by a decidedly less innocent social body
whose two-page list of resentments
is detailed by Morris in “Solecism of
Sight.” “Clearly the social body today carries more wounds than half
a century ago,” writes Morris, and
with an uncharacteristic glimmer
of faith continues, “Perhaps even
its somewhat callow narcissisms and
feckless optimism is beginning to
fade, making room for the possibility of a certain self-criticism that
it never felt much need of before”
(159).

ON ROBERT MORRIS’S HAVE I REASONS
It is from this position of criticality that the volume ends, closing
with an essay that situates the painting of Jasper Johns within the context of his military service, and that
endows Johns’s work with renewed
relevance in a new era of American
military aggression. Readers of Morris’s second volume of writings will
be struck by the explicitly political
viewpoint of such essays, as well as
by the deft handling of philosophy
and prose that graces even Morris’s
more polemical writing in his old
age. From his position as resident
art world curmudgeon Morris continues to “play out the drama of the
shifter,” as Rosalind Krauss put it in
her 1977 article “Notes on the Index.” Morris dislodges the “I” from
its indexical relation to an existential subject and shatters Davidson’s
linkage of it to rationality and belief. The “I” of Morris’s recent
writing has always already escaped
these moorings, but the impish
wordplay of early works like I-Box
is joined in these later writings to a
melancholic imperative “to accept
the darker shadows within ourselves, and to meditate on that
fallen world into which we have
been cast” (253).
—University of Virginia
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